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Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? 
Abstract 
This paper uses a new approach to examine whether income smoothing garbles 
earnings information or improves the informativeness of past and current earnings about 
future earnings and cash flows. We measure income smoothing by the negative 
correlation of a firm’s change in discretionary accruals with its change in pre-managed 
earnings. Using the approach of Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1994), we find that 
change in the current stock price of higher-smoothing firms contains more information 
about their future earnings than does change in the stock price of lower-smoothing firms. 
This result is robust to decomposing earnings into cash flows and accruals and to 
controlling for firm size, growth, future earnings variability, private information search 
activities, and cross-sectional correlations.  
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Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we use a new approach to investigate whether income smoothing garbles 
accounting earnings information or improves the informativeness of firms’ reported 
current and past earnings about their future earnings and cash flows. Income smoothing 
represents managers’ attempts to use their reporting discretion to “intentionally dampen 
the fluctuations of their firms’ earnings realizations” (Beidleman 1973, 653). Although 
income smoothing has been widely documented for decades1, its effect on earnings 
informativeness is largely unknown. On one hand, income smoothing improves earnings 
informativeness if managers use their discretion to communicate their assessment of 
future earnings. On the other hand, income smoothing makes earnings noisier if managers 
intentionally distort the earnings numbers. Which effect dominates in a cross-sectional 
setting is an open, empirical question. Our study contributes to the literature by shedding 
new light on this information-vs-garbling debate. 
Although we examine managers’ discretionary reporting behavior, our study differs 
from most earnings management studies, which focus on the costs of earnings 
management (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998; Marquardt and Wiedman 2005; Bartov and 
Mohanram 2004, etc.). We focus on the benefits of discretionary behavior. Our primary 
contribution is to use the approach of Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (CKSS, 1994) 
and provide evidence that income smoothing improves the informativeness of past and 
current earnings about future earnings and cash flows. We do so by investigating the 
association between current-year stock returns and future earnings for firms with 
                                                 
1 See Beidleman (1973), Ronen and Sadan (1981), Schipper (1989), Subramanyam (1996) and Healy and 
Wahlen (2000).  
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different degrees of smoothing. We refer to this association as the future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC). 
Assuming the informational efficiency of stock price, the CKSS approach examines 
how much information about future earnings is reflected in the change in current stock 
price. This approach is superior to estimating the direct relation between a firm’s future 
earnings and its current and past earnings for two reasons. First, although realized 
earnings are often used to directly predict future earnings, the earnings information can 
be indirectly used by investors in earnings predictions when investors combine it with 
information from other sources (Christensen and Demski 2003, Chapter 10). By using the 
stock price, which aggregates all publicly available information, the CKSS approach 
considers both the direct and the indirect roles of realized earnings. Second, the change in 
(expected) future earnings may be due to a shock that has no effect on current earnings.2 
Such information will not be captured by current earnings, but will be impounded in 
current stock price.   
Our paper is closely related to two recent studies. Subramanyam (1996) finds that 
returns are positively associated with contemporaneous discretionary accruals, while 
Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin (2000) report that income smoothing enhances the 
contemporaneous price-earnings relation. Both papers focus on the relation between 
prices (or returns) and contemporaneous accounting information. In contrast, we focus on 
the relation between returns and future accounting information. Enhancing the relation 
between price (or return) and contemporaneous earnings could be due to lower risk 
and/or greater persistence rather than to increased informativeness about the future. If 
                                                 
2 An example would be an announcement of a new product that will not be commercially available until a 
future period. 
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income smoothing makes earnings more informative, returns should reflect more 
information about future earnings, and the FERC should be higher for firms with greater 
smoothing. If income smoothing merely garbles information, returns should reflect less 
future earnings information, and the FERC should be lower for firms with greater 
smoothing. Thus, our focus allows better assessment of the informativeness of a firm’s 
current and past earnings about future earnings.  
We measure income smoothing as the negative correlation of a firm’s change in 
discretionary accruals with its change in pre-managed income. A more negative 
correlation indicates more income smoothing. Using data from post-1988 we find that 
firms with greater smoothing have higher FERC. This result is robust to decomposing 
earnings into cash flows and accruals; to controlling for firm size, growth, future earnings 
variability, and private information search activities (proxied by analyst following and 
institutional holdings); and to separating loss firms from profit firms. In addition, to 
address potential cross-sectional correlations in the pooled regressions, we extend the 
data to pre-1988 so that the number of cross-sections is large enough for the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) analysis. We find a similar, though weaker, result.   
Despite the above evidence, our findings should be interpreted with caution for two 
reasons. First, market efficiency is assumed in all the tests. If the equity markets are 
inefficient, the interpretation of our findings is unclear. Second, because managers’ 
discretionary behavior is unobservable, our income-smoothing measure suffers from 
potential measurement error problems, something that affects many other earnings 
management studies. We estimate discretionary accruals using the method of Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2004), which controls for measurement error in well- or poorly-
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performing firms. Nevertheless, despite our attempts to ensure that the measurement error 
in the discretionary accruals proxy is not driving the results, we cannot rule out 
measurement error as an alternative explanation for our results.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews previous research on 
the motivations and effects of income smoothing. Section III explains our research 
design. Section IV discusses the data and presents the main empirical results. Section V 
reports the robustness tests and Section VI concludes.   
II. INCOME SMOOTHING: MOTIVATIONS AND EFFECTS 
Income smoothing, which Arthur Levitt labeled “cookie jar” accounting in his 1998 
speech, is not a new issue. Gordon (1964, 262) predicts that as long as managers have 
discretion over accounting choices, they smooth reported income and the rate of growth 
in income. His prediction was tested in several studies. By the late 1970s, evidence for 
income smoothing was plentiful (Beidleman 1973; Ronen and Sadan 1981).    
Recent research has enriched our understanding of managers’ use of their reporting 
discretion, categorizing it as either (i) garbling or (ii) efficient communication of private 
information. Managers may smooth reported income to meet the bonus target (Healy 
1985) or to protect their job (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; Arya, Glover and Sunder 1998). 
The contracting theory argues that income garbling is an equilibrium solution because the 
principal would otherwise pay a high premium to compensate the agent, who has the 
information advantage, for taking additional risk (Lambert 1984; Demski and Frimor 
1999). In these circumstances, even if the contract is efficient, the communication has 
been garbled and thus the reported earnings are less informative about a firm’s future 
earnings and cash flows.  
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In contrast, other studies view income smoothing as a vehicle for managers to reveal 
their private information about future earnings (Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002; 
Ronen and Sadan 1981; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Demski 1998). Such 
communication could be either active or passive. For example, Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad show that reported earnings have dual roles. The level of reported earnings 
allows investors to infer the level of permanent future cash flows. The fluctuations of 
reported earnings reduce investors’ confidence in the inferred permanent component. The 
dual roles cause managers to smooth earnings.3 Using Spence’s (1973) signaling 
framework, Ronen and Sadan argue that only firms with good future prospects smooth 
earnings because borrowing from the future could be disastrous to a poorly performing 
firm when the problem explodes in the near term.  
Private information about future earnings can also be communicated passively. 
Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) demonstrate that managers smooth income to smooth 
consumption and that in so doing they reveal private information about future earnings. 
Demski (1998) shows that, even in the absence of an incentive, future earnings are 
partially communicated in efficient contracting as long as managers use future earnings 
information to decide whether they smooth current earnings. Whether information is 
communicated actively or passively, income smoothing could make firms’ current and 
past earnings more informative about future earnings and cash flows. 
Note that the garbling versus information views lead to diametrically opposite 
predictions. If income smoothing is merely garbling, earnings of firms that experience 
more smoothing should be less informative about future earnings. If income smoothing is 
                                                 
3 Trueman and Titman (1988) find that firms smooth earnings to reduce the cost of borrowing and to 
favorably affect the terms of trade with suppliers and customers.   
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used to convey private information, the relation between current (including past) earnings 
and future earnings should be strengthened and, for the reason to be explained in the next 
section, the FERC is expected to be higher as well. Which effect dominates in a cross-
sectional setting is an unanswered, empirical question that we address. 
Two previous empirical studies are closely related to ours. Using the cross-sectional 
Jones model, Subramanyam (1996) finds that returns are positively associated with 
contemporaneous discretionary accruals, and that discretionary accruals are positively 
associated with future earnings and operating cash flows, implying that discretionary 
accruals convey information about firms’ future prospects. He also finds that the 
correlation between discretionary accruals and pre-discretionary income is negative, 
concluding that firms engage in income smoothing. Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin (2000) find 
that income smoothing enhances the contemporaneous price-earnings relation, suggesting 
that income smoothing improves earnings informativeness. Both papers focus on the 
relation between prices or returns and contemporaneous accounting information. As we 
explained in Section I, we adopt a different approach that focuses on the relation between 
returns and future accounting information.  
 III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 In this section we explain how we measure income smoothing, argue why the FERC 
captures earnings informativeness about future earnings, and present our primary and 
supplementary econometric models.  
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Income-Smoothing Measure 
Income smoothing is defined as “an attempt on the part of the firm’s management to 
reduce abnormal variations in earnings to the extent allowed under sound accounting and 
management principles” (Beidleman 1973, 653). Following Myers and Skinner (2002) 
and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), we measure income smoothing by the negative 
correlation between the change in discretionary-accruals proxy (“∆DAP”) and change in 
pre-discretionary income (“∆PDI”). This measure assumes that there is an underlying 
pre-managed income series and that managers use discretionary accruals to make the 
reported series smooth. More income smoothing is evident in a more negative correlation 
between ∆DAP and ∆PDI.  
To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the cross-sectional version of the Jones 
model, modified by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2004).  
Accruals t = a (1/Assets t-1) + b ∆Sales t + c PPE t + d ROA t + µ t              (1) 
In Regression (1), the total accruals (Accruals); change in sales (∆Sales); and gross 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) are each deflated by the beginning-of-year total 
assets (Assets).4 Return on assets (ROA) is added as an additional control variable, 
because previous research finds that the Jones model is misspecified for well-performing 
or poorly-performing firms (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1996; Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley 2004).  
To employ a large number of observations, we run the regression on all firms in the 
same industry (2-digit SIC) each year. The non-discretionary accruals (NDAP) are the 
fitted values of Regression (1) and the discretionary accruals (DAP) are the deviations of 
                                                 
4 “Accruals” are net income minus CFO, where CFO is obtained from the cash flow statements. “Net 
income”, “CFO”, “Sales”, “PPE,” and “Assets” are the variables Data18, Data308, Data12, Data7, and 
Data6 in the Compustat’s combined industry annual data file, respectively.   
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actual accruals from NDAP. The pre-discretionary income (PDI) is calculated using the 
“backing out” approach: net income minus discretionary accruals (PDI = NI – DAP). 
 The income-smoothing measure is the correlation between the change in 
discretionary accruals and change in pre-discretionary income: Corr (∆DAP, ∆PDI), 
using the current year’s and past four years’ observations. The use of five observations is 
a tradeoff between a sufficiently long time-series for the income-smoothing measure and 
a large sample to test the model. We use annual data because there is much evidence that 
firms smooth fiscal-year earnings and that fourth-quarter reporting is distinctively 
different from that of other quarters (Jacob and Jorgensen 2003; Das and Shroff 2002). 
To control for industry and time effects, we use a firm’s reversed fractional ranking of 
income smoothing (between 0 and 1) within its industry-year (2-digit SIC) and refer to it 
as “IS.” As a result, firms with a more negative correlation receive a higher income-
smoothing ranking.5  
FERC and Earnings Informativeness  
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between FERC and earnings informativeness.6 
Because business operating cycles are continuous, when a firm gradually realizes its 
current earnings it has certain private knowledge about the future earnings.7 The more 
information a firm has about the future, the more successfully it can smooth its income 
series. Consequently, information about future earnings is revealed by a firm’s reporting 
behavior well before the earnings are recognized. The information is reflected in the 
                                                 
5 A fractional ranking is the raw rank divided by the number of observations. For example, the fractional 
rankings of 1 and 10 among the numbers 1 to 10 are 0.1and 1, respectively.  
6 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting Figure 1.  
7 Although earnings are reported quarterly, the information about earnings arrives at the market 
continuously (Ball and Brown 1968, Figure 1).  
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change in current stock price, which aggregates the information with other sources of 
public signals through the force of market arbitrage and in the process of price discovery. 
Thus, the change in current stock price captures the change in investors’ expectation for 
future earnings. The strength of this relation is measured by the FERC in the CKSS 
framework.  
Primary and Supplementary Models  
The CKSS framework has its theoretical underpinning in the discounted cash flows 
valuation model. By assuming that investors’ revisions in dividend expectations are fully 
summarized by their revisions in earnings expectations, CKSS model the return-earnings 
relation as Regression (2). 
3
0 1
1
( )t t k t t
k
R UX E X k tα β γ +
=
= + + ∆ +∑ ε                (2) 
where, tR  is the ex-dividend annual stock return for Year t, is the difference 
between the realized earnings for Year t and what was expected at the beginning of the 
year, 
tUX
t kX +  is the reported earnings for Year t+k, and ( )t t kE X +∆ is the change in 
expectations between the end and beginning of Year t for earnings in Year t+k.8 Here, 
1β is the ERC, kγ is the FERC for Year t+k, and both are predicted to be positive. 
Because investors’ earnings expectations are unobservable, implementing the model 
requires the use of proxies. CKSS use the reported earnings for Year t-1 as the proxy for 
the expectation component of . Because the expectation is subtracted from realized 
earnings, the coefficient on past earnings should be negative. For 
tUX
( )t t kE X +∆ , CKSS use 
                                                 
8 By “Year”, we mean “Fiscal Year” throughout the paper.  
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the realized earnings for Year t+k as a proxy for the expectation formed at the end of 
Year t, and use past earnings to form an expectation at the beginning of Year t. To reduce 
the measurement error problem in using realized earnings (Year t+k) for expected 
earnings (expectation formed at the end of Year t), CKSS include future returns. The 
logic is that if realized earnings are higher (lower) than expectation, stock price should 
increase (decrease) accordingly from Year t+1 to t+k. This positive correlation leads to a 
negative loading on the future returns variable in the regression.  
CKSS use earnings changes as the independent variables, implicitly assuming that 
annual earnings follow a random walk. Lundholm and Myers (2002) use the levels of 
past, current, and future earnings to allow for a more general form of earnings 
expectations model. To increase the power of test, Lundholm and Myers combine the 
three future years’ earnings into variable Xt3 and the three future years’ returns into Rt3. 
As a result, we implement the CKSS approach by Regression (3).  
     Rt = b0 + b1Xt-1+ b2 Xt+ b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3  + ε t                                                           (3) 
In (3), Xt-1 and Xt are the earnings per share (EPS) for Year t-1 and t, respectively, 
and Xt3 is the sum of EPS for Year t+1 to t+3. All the EPS variables are the basic EPS 
excluding extraordinary items (Compustat Data58), adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends, and, according to Christie (1987), deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of Year t. Rt3 is the aggregate stock return in Year t+1 to t+3 with annual compounding. 
The coefficient on past earnings (b1) is predicted to be negative, the ERC (b2) is predicted 
to be positive, the FERC (b3) is predicted to be positive, and the coefficient on future 
returns (b4) is predicted to be negative. 
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To address our research question, we expand the above regression by adding the 
income-smoothing measure “IS” and its interactions with the existing independent 
variables. Regression (4) is our primary empirical model:  
            Rt = b0 + b1Xt-1+ b2 Xt+ b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3
                              + b5 ISt + b6 ISt * Xt-1 + b7 ISt *Xt + b8 ISt * Xt3 + b9 ISt * Rt3  + ε t       (4)  
We estimate (4) on pooled cross-sectional, time-series data. If the dominating effect 
of income smoothing is to convey information about future earnings, the coefficient on 
“ISt * Xt3” should be positive. If the garbling effect of income smoothing dominates, 
earnings would be less informative and thus the coefficient is expected to be negative.  
As we explained in Section I, using stock price has an advantage over estimating the 
relation between current earnings and future earnings. Despite the difference, the two 
tests are related. If income smoothing improves earnings informativeness, it must 
strengthen the relation between future earnings and current earnings – i.e., it must 
increase earnings persistence. To confirm this, we estimate the relation between current 
and future earnings in Regression (5).  
EPS t3 = a0 + a1 EPS t + a2 IS t + a3 IS t * EPS t + ε t                                             (5) 
Here, EPSt is the EPS for fiscal year t and EPSt3 is the sum of EPS in fiscal year t+1 
to t+3, both undeflated. Our interest is the coefficient on IS t * EPS t, which should be 
positive if income smoothing strengthens the relation between current and future 
earnings. 
IV. DATA AND MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We use the 2004 version of Compustat’s combined industrial annual data file and 
choose 1993-2000 as the sample period for the primary test. The period begins with 1993 
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because 1988 is the first year in which firms are required to report cash flow statements, 
and we use five observations of ∆DAP and ∆PDI to calculate the income-smoothing 
measure. Firms in the financial and regulated industries are excluded due to their unique 
nature of accounting (SIC 4000-4999 and 6000-6999).  
Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
For this estimation, we use the data from 1988-2000 and run Regression (1) on each 
of the 650 industry-year cross-sections, after excluding 110 cross-sections that have 
fewer than 10 observations and winsorizing the regression variables at the three 
standardization deviations each year. Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, 
median, minimum, and maximum of the coefficient estimates and R2. The average R2 is 
0.642, indicating that about 2/3 of the cross-sectional variation in firms’ total accruals is 
explained by the identified independent variables. The coefficients on “1/Assetst-1” and 
“PPEt” are comparable to those reported in Subramanyam (1996), and the coefficient on 
“∆Salest” is lower than that in Subramanyam due to our additional control for earnings 
performance. A firm’s asset-deflated nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals are the 
fitted values and residuals, respectively.  
Income-Smoothing Measure and Data Cleaning 
PDI is calculated as net income minus DAP, both deflated by the beginning-of-year 
total assets. A firm-year observation is deleted if its ∆DAP or ∆PDI is missing in the 
current year and the past five years. The income-smoothing measure is calculated for the 
remaining firm-year observations.  
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For the primary test, we delete the firm-year observations that have missing data for 
past, current, and future three years’ earnings, operating cash flows, and accruals as well 
as those for current and future three years’ returns. To minimize the effect of outliers, we 
delete the observations that are in the top or bottom 1% of the distributions of the above 
variables. Even with this effort, extreme outliers are still observed. We further delete the 
observations whose earnings, operating cash flows, or total accruals in the past, current, 
or any of the future three years are greater than 10 times or less than -10 times the market 
equity value, or whose future three years’ compound returns are greater than 10 or less 
than -10. These procedures result in 17, 019 observations for the primary test.  
Primary Model Test Results  
Panel A of Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the 17,019 sample 
observations. The first five rows list the variables in the primary test. “Accruals” and 
“CFO” will be used in the extended model for a robustness test. The last two rows 
provide information about the raw income-smoothing measure and DAP.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the pairwise correlations between the variables used in 
Regression (4). The raw income-smoothing measure is negatively associated with past, 
current, and future earnings. This indicates that firms with better performance smooth 
income to a larger degree, consistent with the prediction of the signaling argument as 
discussed in Section II.   
Table 3 reports the main test results. First, in Panel A we present the results of 
Regression (5), the traditional earnings persistence model.9As predicted, the coefficient 
                                                 
9The results are similar if the EPS variables are deflated by the stock price at the beginning of Year t.  
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on the interaction between IS and EPS is significantly positive (a3 = 0.703, t-statistic = 
11.24), confirming that income smoothing strengthens earnings persistence. 
Second, to compare with previous research using CKSS, in Panel B we present the 
results of the benchmark CKSS model (Regression (3)). As predicted, both the ERC and 
FERC are significantly positive. The positive FERC indicates that a significant amount of 
information about future earnings has been impounded in current stock price. The 
coefficient on past earnings and future returns are both negative, as predicted.  
Panel C reports the results of our primary model. After we include the income-
smoothing variable IS, the interaction term “ISt*Xt3” has a significantly positive loading 
(b8 = 0.308, t-statistic = 4.99), indicating that income smoothing enhances the FERC. The 
evidence supports the view that income smoothing improves the informativeness of past 
and current earnings about future earnings. Income smoothing also improves the ERC, 
evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient on “ISt *Xt” (b7 = 0.681, t-statistic = 
4.08), consistent with Hunt et al. (2000).  
The coefficients on ISt and ISt*Xt-1 (b5 and b6) are both significant, confirming their 
importance as control variables, even though we are primarily interested in the effect of 
smoothing on FERC and ERC (b8 and b7). Although the interaction “ISt*Xt3” is 
significantly positive, the coefficient on Xt3 loses its significance after the inclusion of 
income smoothing. This suggests that stock price impounds information about future 
earnings only in the presence of income smoothing.       
V. EXTENSION AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We have several concerns about the primary model. In this section we report how we 
extend the model to address these concerns.  
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Decomposing Earnings into Cash Flows and Accruals 
Although earnings are positively correlated with operating cash flows, predicting cash 
flows is the main task of equity valuation. Thus, we extend the model to examine whether 
income smoothing allows more information about future cash flows to be impounded in 
current stock price.10 In Regression (6), we decompose earnings into CFO and accruals 
(“ACC”). Our key interest is the interaction between income smoothing and future cash 
flows (ISt*CFOt3). If income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness about future 
cash flows, the coefficient b11 should be positive; if income smoothing garbles 
information, b11 should be negative. Because we are unaware of any theory of or 
empirical evidence on how income smoothing affects the predictability of future accruals, 
we have no prediction for the coefficient on IS t *ACCt3.   
        Rt = b0+ b1CFOt-1+ b2 CFOt+ b3 CFOt3 + b4 ACCt-1+ b5 ACCt+ b6 ACCt3+ b7 Rt3  
                + b8 ISt + b9 ISt * CFOt-1+ b10  ISt * CFOt + b11 ISt * CFOt3   
                + b12 ISt * ACCt-1 + b13 IS t *ACCt + b14 IS t *ACCt3 + b15 IS t * Rt3 + ε t         (6)   
Panel D of Table 3 reports the test results. The coefficient on ISt * CFOt3 is 
significantly positive (b11 = 0.160, t-statistic = 2.81), suggesting that the stock price of 
firms that engage in more income smoothing impounds more information about their 
future cash flows. This finding is consistent with our primary results when earnings are 
used. Note that the coefficient on ISt * ACCt3 is also significantly positive (b14 = 0.264,  
t-statistic = 4.79), indicating that stock price also captures more information about future 
accruals when firms report smoother earnings.  
 
                                                 
10 Another reason for the earnings decomposition is that smoothing reduces the variance of earnings, and 
thus may increase the ERC and FERC by construction.  
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Controlling for Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables  
We are concerned that the statistical significance relating to income smoothing may 
be due to omitted correlated variables. Other factors could make stock price impound 
more information about future earnings. Omitting these factors would overstate the 
statistical inference of IS. For example, larger firms may make more disclosures for fear 
of litigation risk (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson 2001). 
Anticipating future access to the capital markets, firms with higher growth prospects 
perhaps disclose more forward-looking information to reduce information asymmetry 
(Frankel, McNichols and Wilson 1995). If a firm’s future earnings are volatile, they are 
more difficult to predict and thus the amount of future earnings information impounded 
in current stock price is low. In addition, a firm’s stock price probably impounds more 
information about future earnings when there are more private information search 
activities by analysts and institutional investors.  
To address these concerns, we control for firm size, growth, future earnings 
variability, analyst following, and institutional holdings. Firm size (“Size”) is measured 
as the market value of common equity at the beginning of Year t (Compustat 
Data199*Data25). Firm growth is proxied by the book-to-market ratio (“BM”) at the 
beginning of Year t (Penman 1996), which is measured as the ratio of book value of 
common equity (Compustat Data60) over market value of equity. For future earnings 
variability (“EarnStd”), we use the standard deviation of EPS (Compustat Data58, 
adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) for Year t+1 to t+3, deflated by the stock 
price at the beginning of Year t. These data requirements reduce the number of 
observations from 17,019 to 17,011.  
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Analyst following (“Analysts”) is measured as the average number of analysts’ 
forecasts included in the monthly consensus, compiled by IBES during Year t. Among 
the 17,011 observations, 11,879 are covered by IBES with the mean and median analyst 
coverage being 7.746 and 4.909, respectively (untabulated). Following Frankel and Li 
(2004), we set the number of analyst following to zero if a firm-year is not covered by 
IBES.  
Institutional holdings (“Institution”) are obtained from CDA/Spectrum and measured 
as the average proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end of each 
quarter of Year t. The variable is treated as missing if a firm-year is not covered by 
CDA/Spectrum. We delete 61 observations for which the institutional holding ratio is 
larger than 1 (data error). For the remaining 16,950 observations, 13,954 are covered by 
CDA/Spectrum with the mean and median institutional holding ratio being 0.367 and 
0.356, respectively (untabulated).   
The new control variables are converted into fractional rankings within their industry-
year before they enter the regression. 11 We add new control variables to the primary 
model one at a time, referred to as “Zt” in Regression (7). The control is exercised 
through the interaction Zt * Xt3. The mean effect of Zt is included because omitting it 
would make the interpretation of Zt * Xt3 problematic if Zt directly affects returns. 
      Rt =   b0  +  b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3  + b5 ISt + b6 ISt * Xt-1   
                                  + b7 ISt *Xt + b8 ISt * Xt3 + b9 ISt * Rt3  + b10 Zt + b11 Zt * Xt3 + ε t           (7) 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimation results. Throughout the individual models, 
the coefficients on ISt *Xt3 remain significantly positive, supporting our previous 
                                                 
11 In case of ties, the lowest corresponding ranks are assigned. For observations that are not covered by 
IBES, the analyst-coverage rankings are set to zero.    
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conclusion that income smoothing improves earnings informativeness. In addition, future 
earnings variable “Xt3” interacts positively with firm size, growth, analyst following, and 
institutional holdings, and interacts negatively with future earnings variability.12 These 
results confirm that the information environment is richer for large high-growth firms and 
firms with high analyst coverage and institutional holdings, and that stock price contains 
less information about future earnings when these earnings are more difficult to predict.  
Panel B reports the test results with all five new controls in place, using the 
observations that have institutional holdings data. The coefficient on ISt*Xt3 is weakly 
significantly positive in a two-tailed test (b8 = 0.118, t-statistic = 1.83). The coefficients 
on the interactive terms for size, growth, and future earnings variability are similar to 
those in Panel A. In the presence of these controls, the level of analyst coverage is 
associated with lower FERC (b17 = -0.149, t-statistic = -1.91)13, and institutional holdings 
are unrelated to FERC (b19 = -0.06, t-statistic = -0.66).  
Finally, in Panel C, we create two dummy variables so that we can use the 
information about analyst following and institutional holdings, when the information is 
available, to estimate the coefficients relating to these two controls, and we can use the 
full sample to estimate other coefficients. “Dumcovert” takes the value of 1 for the firm-
years covered by IBES and 0 otherwise. “Dumholdt” takes the value of 1 for those 
covered by CDA/Spectrum and 0 otherwise. The results for the control variables are 
similar to those in Panel B. The reported coefficient on ISt *Xt3 is increased to 0.129, 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, we run regressions in which each of the new control variables interacts with all existing 
independent variables and find similar results. To save space, we report our results for Regression (7) only.  
13 When only the analyst control is included for this sample of 13,954 observations, Zt * Xt3 has a 
coefficient of 0.369 with a t-statistic of 7.14, both of which are very similar to the results in Panel A for the 
full sample of 17,011 observations. This confirms that it is the additional controls, and not the change in 
sample, that reduces the effect of analyst coverage in the regression model in Panel B. 
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significantly positive (t-statistic 2.26), confirming that income smoothing improves 
earnings informativeness.   
Profit vs. Loss Firms 
Prior research has demonstrated that profits are more value relevant than losses 
because (i) losses are more transitory (Basu 1997) and (ii) the values of loss firms are 
bounded below by the liquidation option (Hayn 1995). Among the 17,019 observations 
used for the main test, 4,391 observations (25.8%) have current losses. In Regression (8), 
we add a dummy variable for current year losses and its interaction with Xt and Xt3.  
       Rt =   b0  +  b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3   
                                           + b5 ISt + b6 ISt * Xt-1+ b7 ISt *Xt + b8 ISt * Xt3 + b9 ISt * Rt3   
                                  + b10 Losst + b11 Losst * Xt  +  b12 Losst * Xt3  + ε t                              (8)     
Table 5 shows that, with this control, income-smoothing does not change the ERC but 
enhances the FERC (coefficient 0.172 and t-statistic 2.84), indicating that for these firms 
the stock price of higher income-smoothing firms compounds more information about 
future earnings than that of lower income-smoothing firms. For loss firms, both the ERC 
and FERC attenuate. The significantly negative coefficient on Losst * Xt indicates that the 
ERC for loss firms is lower than that for profit firms, consistent with prior research. The 
significantly negative coefficient on Losst * Xt3 suggests that the stock price of loss firms 
reflects less information about their future earnings than that of profit firms.  
Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
In running cross-sectional regressions, the potential positive cross-sectional 
correlations of the residuals are a valid concern. If they exist, our inferences would have 
been overstated. To address this concern, we extend the sample period to pre-1988 data 
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(before the advent of the cash flow statements) to obtain a large number of cross-sections 
for the Fama-MacBeth analysis. For pre-1988, we use the “balance sheet” approach to 
estimate total accruals.14 The longer time series also allows us to increase the number of 
observations for calculating the income-smoothing measure from 5 to 7.  
The results are reported in Table 6. The left columns of the table report the results of 
the primary model (4), and the right columns report the results of the extended model (6). 
The table reports the means, medians, and t-statistics of the three key coefficients in the 
21 annual regressions from 1980 to 2000. The mean coefficient on ISt *Xt is 0.565, 
significantly positive in a two-tailed test (Fama-MacBeth t-statistic 4.65). The mean 
coefficient on ISt * Xt3 is 0.097, weakly significantly positive in a two-tailed test (Fama-
MacBeth statistic 1.70). The right columns of the table report the earnings-decomposition 
regressions. The mean coefficients on ISt * CFOt and on ISt * CFOt3 are 0.388 and 0.162, 
respectively, both significantly positive in a two-tailed test (Fama-MacBeth t-statistics 
2.62 and 3.19, respectively). Overall, the results confirm our primary test results. 
In summary, the robustness-test results are consistent and support the conclusion that 
income smoothing improves earnings informativeness about future earnings and cash 
flows.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
We use a new approach to investigate whether income smoothing garbles accounting 
earnings information or improves the informativeness of firms’ current and past earnings 
about their future earnings and cash flows. We measure income smoothing as the 
                                                 
14 The operating cash flows are measured as net income before extraordinary items minus the increase in 
noncash current assets, plus the increase in current liabilities (excluding the short-term portion of long-term 
debts) and plus depreciation expense (Collins and Hribar 2002). 
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negative correlation of a firm’s change in discretionary accruals with its change in pre-
managed income. A more negative correlation indicates more income smoothing.  
Using the method of Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1994), we find that a 
higher-smoothing firm’s future earnings are impounded in its current stock price to a 
larger extent than that of a lower-smoothing firm. Such results are robust after we 
decompose earnings into operating cash flows and accruals; separate loss firms from 
profit firms; and control for firm size, growth, future earnings variability, private 
information search activities, and potential cross-sectional correlations. Thus, we 
document empirically that an important effect of managers’ use of financial reporting 
discretion is to reveal more information about firms’ future earnings and cash flows. Our 
work contributes to the literature by shedding new light on this information-vs-garbling 
debate.  
Our results are subject to two caveats. First, the interpretation of our results critically 
relies upon the assumption of market efficiency. In the presence of mispricing, our results 
are subject to reinterpretation. Second, despite all our attempts to ensure that 
measurement error in the income-smoothing measure is not driving the results, we cannot 
rule out measurement error as an alternative explanation for the results. 
Our paper presents the first empirical evidence that stock prices impound more 
information about future earnings when firms smooth their reported income. Perhaps 
more important than its results, the paper presents a new approach to studying the effects 
of earnings management. The informativeness methodology used here to study income 
smoothing can be applied to other types of earnings management and thus represents a 
promising area for future research. 
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Figure 1 
The Relation between the FERC and Earnings Informativenss 
In the Presence of Income Smoothing 
 
Firm 
Current earnings are 
gradually realized but 
not reported. 
Past earnings are 
reported. 
Future earnings are 
anticipated. 
Firm reports current 
earnings so that the 
income series is smooth 
and the smoothness will 
continue. 
Future earnings are revealed in the 
process of reporting current earnings. 
The information is aggregated in 
stock price together with other 
sources of information. 
Change in current stock price 
contains the information about future 
earnings 
The relation is measured by the FERC.  
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 Table 1 
Cross-Sectional Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
 
 
The Jones Model – modified by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2004): 
 
                 
Accruals t = a (1/Assets t-1) + b ∆Sales t + c PPE t + d ROA t + µ t
 
 
Statistics a B c D R2
mean 0.112 0.013 -0.074 0.457 0.642 
Std. Dev. 2.528 0.191 0.129 0.326 0.229 
Median 0.068 0.016 -0.077 0.440 0.668 
Minimum -60.167 -3.072 -1.289 -0.810 0.031 
Maxmium 6.413 1.003 1.819 1.743 1.000 
 
Notes:  
1. The table presents the summary statistics of the estimated coefficients and R2 of 
650 industry-year regressions from 1988-2000, where industries are classified by 
the first two digits of the SIC code.   
2. Variable Definitions:  
(i) “Accruals t” are the total accruals in Fiscal Year t obtained by subtracting 
operating cash flows from net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (Compustat Data18), deflated by the beginning-of-
year total assets (Compustat Data6).  
(ii) “Assets t-1” are the total assets at the beginning of Fiscal Year t. 
(iii) “∆Sales t” are the change in sales (Compustat Data12) from Fiscal Year t-1 to 
t.   
(iv) “PPE t” are the gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat Data7) at the 
end of Fiscal Year t. 
(v) “ROA t” is the ratio of net income over the beginning-of-year total assets for 
Fiscal Year t. 
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Table 2 
Sample Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (17,019 firm-year observations during 1993-2000) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
R t 0.153 0.688 0.047 -0.949 10.000 
X t-1  -0.002 0.185 0.043 -3.480 0.370 
X t  0.015 0.145 0.047 -1.985 0.508 
X t3  0.074 0.362 0.125 -3.154 2.238 
R t3 0.335 1.162 0.071 -0.998 9.992 
ACC t -0.070 0.165 -0.038 -2.177 0.609 
CFO t 0.086 0.151 0.078 -1.043 1.246 
Corr (∆DAP t, ∆PDI t ) -0.709 0.418 -0.899 -1.000 1.000 
DAP t -0.047 0.525 -0.023 -41.540 4.349 
 
 
Panel B: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) Correlations above (below) the Diagonal (17,019 
observations) 
 
 R t X t-1 X t X t3 R t3 Corr (∆DAP t, ∆PDI t ) 
R t  -0.020 0.188 0.080 -0.115 0.006#
X t-1 0.090  0.466 0.315 0.040 -0.201 
X t 0.401 0.547  0.450 0.040 -0.170 
X t3 0.292 0.395 0.532  0.363 -0.138 
R t3 -0.069 0.146 0.141 0.539  -0.022 
Corr (∆DAP t, ∆PDI t ) -0.058 -0.243 -0.216 -0.188 -0.091  
Note: “#” indicates statistically insignificance. The unmarked correlations are statistically 
significant at 5% or lower in a two-tailed test.  
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Table 2 
Sample Statistics 
(Continued) 
 
Variable Definitions:  
(i) “R t” is the ex-dividend stock return during Fiscal Year t.  
(ii) “X t-1” is the earnings per share (Compustat Data58, adjusted for stock splits 
and stock dividends) for Fiscal Year t-1, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(iii) “X t” is the earnings per share for Fiscal Year t, deflated by the stock price at 
the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(iv) “X t3” is the sum of earnings per share for Fiscal Year t+1 through t+3, 
deflated by the stock price at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(v) “R t3” is the annually compounded stock return for Fiscal Year t+1 through 
t+3.  
(vi) “ACC t” are the total accruals in Fiscal Year t obtained by subtracting 
operating cash flows from net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (Compustat Data18). To prepare for the returns 
regression, different from “Accruals” in Table 1, this variable is deflated by 
the market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(vii) “CFO t” are the cash flows from operations reported in the cash flow 
statements (Compustat Data308) for Fiscal Year t, deflated by the market 
value at the beginning of the year.  
(viii) “Corr (∆DAP t, ∆PDI t)” is the Pearson correlation between the change in 
discretionary accruals and the change in pre-managed income. 
(ix) “DAP t” is the discretionary accruals for Fiscal Year t, which are deflated by 
the beginning-of-year total assets.  
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 Table 3 
Main Tests 
 
Panel A: Earnings-Persistence Model: 
EPS t3 = a0 + a1 EPS t + a2 IS t + a3 IS t * EPS t + ε t                                                          Adjusted R2    
            0.157    1.034     0.658            0.703                                                        0.278 
            (2.74)   (32.06)   (6.56)          (11.24) 
 
Panel B: Benchmark CKSS Model  
Rt =  b0  +  b1 X t-1 +  b2  X t  +  b3 X t3  +  b4 R t3  +  ut                                                      Adjusted R2
      0.155     -0.535     1.074       0.146      -0.086                                                0.068            
    (28.93)   (-17.07)   (25.04)     (8.46)     (-18.15) 
 
Panel C: Primary Model  
Rt =   b0  +  b1 X t-1 + b2 X t + b3 X t3 + b4 R t3                                                  Adjusted R2
       0.186    -0.296    0.856    -0.002    -0.084                                                     0.072        
      (16.30)   (-5.66)  (11.21)   (-0.07)   (-8.88)    
 
                   + b5 IS t + b6 IS t * X t-1 + b7 IS t *X t + b8 IS t * X t3 + b9 IS t * R t3  + ε t                                       
         -0.069        -0.686                0.681              0.308            -0.007                                                      
         (-3.61)        (-5.51)              (4.08)               (4.99)           (-0.43) 
 
Panel D: Extended Model – earnings decomposition 
Rt = b0  +  b1CFOt-1 + b2 CFOt + b3 CFOt3  + b4 ACCt-1 + b5 ACCt + b6 ACCt3 + b7 Rt3  
      0.131     -0.829         1.065        0.064         -0.227          0.657        -0.183       -0.085 
      (9.61)    (-8.25)        (10.09)      (2.02)         (-3.93)         (8.77)        (-6.13)      (-9.10) 
    + b8 ISt + b9 ISt * CFOt-1+ b10  ISt * CFOt + b11 ISt * CFOt3   
       -0.064          0.023                   0.589                   0.160 
       (-2.76)         (0.13)                   (2.96)                   (2.81) 
                + b12 ISt * ACCt-1 + b13 IS t *ACCt + b14 IS t *ACCt3 + b15 IS t * Rt3 + ε t        Adjusted R2
               -0.687                     0.924                  0.264                 -0.002                  0.084 
               (-5.02)                     (5.61)                 (4.79)                 (-0.10) 
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Table 3 
Main Tests 
(Continued) 
Notes:  
1. The number of observations is 17,019. 
2. Variable Definitions: 
(i) “R t” is the ex-dividend stock return for Fiscal Year t.  
(ii) “EPS t” is the earnings per share (Compustat Data58, adjusted for stock 
splits and stock dividends) for Fiscal Year t, undeflated. 
(iii) “EPS t3” is the sum of earnings per share for Fiscal Year t+1 through t+3, 
undeflated. 
(iv) “X t-1” is the earnings per share (Compustat Data58, adjusted for stock splits 
and stock dividends) for Fiscal Year t-1, deflated by the stock price at the 
beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(v) “X t” is the earnings per share for Fiscal Year t, deflated by the stock price 
at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(vi) “X t3” is the sum of earnings per share for Fiscal Year t+1 through t+3, 
deflated by the stock price at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(vii) “R t3” is the annually compounded stock return for Fiscal Year t+1 through 
t+3.  
(viii) “IS t” is the reversed fractional ranking of the Pearson correlation between 
the current year and past four years’ change in discretionary accruals and 
change in pre-managed income. 
(ix) “CFO t-1” are the operating cash flows (Compustat Data308) for Fiscal Year 
t-1, deflated by the market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t. 
(x) “CFO t” are the operating cash flows for Fiscal Year t, deflated by the 
market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(xi) “CFO t3” are the operating cash flows for Fiscal Year t+1 through t+3, 
deflated by the market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(xii) “ACC t-1” are the total accruals for Fiscal Year t-1, obtained by subtracting 
operating cash flows (Compustat Data308) from net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat Data18),  
deflated by the market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(xiii) “ACC t” are the total accruals for Fiscal Year t, deflated by the market value 
at the beginning of Fiscal Year t. 
(xiv) “ACC t3” are the total accruals for Fiscal Year t+1 through t+3, deflated by 
the market value at the beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
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Table 4 
Robustness Tests 
Controlling for Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables 
 
Panel A: Adding a single new control variable Zt (Variable definitions are 
provided at the end of the table) 
Rt =   b0  +  b1 X t-1 + b2 X t + b3 X t3 + b4 R t3  + b5 IS t + b6 IS t * X t-1   
                      + b7 IS t *X t + b8 IS t * X t3 + b9 IS t * R t3  + b10 Z t + b11 Z t * X t3 + ε t  
           Z t =  Size t BM t EarnStd t Analysts t Institution t
Intercept 0.228 
(16.13) 
0.499 
(36.88) 
-0.092 
(-5.71) 
0.163 
(12.71) 
0.155 
(8.54) 
X t-1 -0.277 
(-5.31) 
-0.239 
(-4.77) 
-0.267 
(-5.21) 
-0.304 
(-5.83) 
-0.221 
(-3.59) 
X t 0.889 
(11.66) 
0.924 
(12.64) 
0.799 
(10.63) 
0.856 
(11.21) 
0.890 
(9.74) 
X t3 -0.190 
(-5.03) 
-0.162 
(-4.22) 
0.866 
(14.49) 
-0.108 
(-3.05) 
-0.239 
(-4.73) 
R t3 -0.087 
(-9.27) 
-0.064 
(-7.07) 
-0.101 
(-10.88) 
-0.087 
(-9.21) 
-0.095 
(-9.04) 
IS t -0.074 
(-3.82) 
-0.009 
(-0.50) 
-0.054 
(-2.84) 
-0.080 
(-4.16) 
-0.085 
(-3.98) 
IS t * X t-1   -0.636 
(-5.12) 
-0.514 
(-4.31) 
-0.631 
(-5.16) 
-0.659 
(-5.30) 
-0.985 
(-6.65) 
IS t *X t 0.668 
(4.02) 
0.541 
(3.38) 
0.594 
(3.63) 
0.690 
(4.14) 
0.753 
(3.87) 
IS t * X t3 0.291 
(4.74) 
0.199 
(3.34) 
0.265 
(4.37) 
0.298 
(4.87) 
0.267 
(3.82) 
IS t * R t3  -0.011 
(-0.63) 
-0.008 
(-0.53) 
-0.009 
(-0.54) 
-0.008 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
Z t -0.118 
(-6.08) 
-0.674 
(-39.42) 
0.438 
(22.91) 
0.039 
(2.49) 
0.052 
(2.07) 
Z t * X t3 0.630 
(10.77) 
0.265 
(6.26) 
-0.973 
(-16.30) 
0.382 
(8.32) 
0.599 
(8.25) 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.150 0.105 0.077 0.085 
Observations 17,011 17,011 17,011 17,011 13,954 
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Table 4 Robustness Tests 
Controlling for Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables 
 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Full Model (13,954 observations that have institutional holdings data) 
Rt =   b0  +  b1 Xt-1 +  b2 Xt  +  b3 Xt3  +  b4 Rt3                                                                    Adjusted R2
       0.316   -0.029     0.964     0.555    -0.089                                                  0.252      
     (12.65)   (-0.53)   (11.66)   (7.02)     (-9.37)      
                + b5 ISt + b6 ISt * Xt-1   + b7 ISt *Xt + b8 ISt * Xt3 + b9 ISt * Rt3   
      0.052         -0.720              0.351           0.118            -0.015                
                  (2.67)         (-5.37)             (1.99)           (1.83)           (-0.90)                
      + b10 Sizet + b11 Sizet * Xt3 + b12 BMt + b13 BMt* Xt3  + b14 EarnStdt + b15 EarnStdt * Xt3   
                     -0.551                0.621        -0.965            0.474              0.639                   -1.012  
                    (-15.53)              (5.82)       (-48.76)          (9.81)            (30.27)                 (-15.80) 
                + b16 Analystst + b17 Analystst * Xt3  +  b18 Insitutiont + b19 Insitutiont * Xt3 +   ε t                
                          0.164                     -0.149                   0.229                      -0.060 
                          (5.87)                     (-1.91)                  (7.48)                     (-0.66) 
 
Panel C: Full Model (16,950 observations) 
Rt =   b0  +  b1 Xt-1 +  b2 Xt  +  b3 Xt3  +  b4 Rt3                                                                    Adjusted R2
       0.323   -0.135     0.920     0.560    -0.082                                                  0.232      
     (13.31)   (-2.84)   (13.16)   (8.19)     (-9.50)      
                + b5 ISt + b6 ISt * Xt-1   + b7 ISt *Xt + b8 ISt * Xt3 + b9 ISt * Rt3   
       0.051         -0.335              0.353           0.129            -0.018                
                   (2.85)         (-2.95)             (2.32)           (2.26)           (-1.19)                
      + b10 Sizet + b11 Sizet * Xt3 + b12 BMt + b13 BMt* Xt3  + b14 EarnStdt + b15 EarnStdt * Xt3   
                     -0.491                0.532        -0.894            0.376              0.619                   -0.978  
                    (-15.45)              (5.92)       (-49.76)          (8.95)             (32.00)                (-16.75) 
                + b16 (Analystst* Dumcovert) + b17 (Analystst* Dumcovert) * Xt3   
                                      0.191                                     -0.148                    
                                      (5.14)                                     (-2.15)                   
    +  b18 (Insitutiont* Dumholdt) + b19 (Insitutiont* Dumholdt) * Xt3 
                                       0.165                                    0.018 
                                      (5.81)                                    (0.32) 
    +  b20 Dumcovert + b21 Dumholdt + ε t  
                           -0.002                 -0.040                     
               (-0.07)                 (-2.06)      
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Table 4 
Robustness Tests 
Controlling for Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables 
 (Continued) 
 
Notes:  
1. The first four columns of Panel A use 17,011 observations. The number of 
observations is less than that in Table 3 because of missing data for firm size, 
B/M and earnings variability (8 observations).  
2. The last column of Panel A and Panel B use 13,954 observations that have 
institutional holdings data.  
3. Panel C uses 16,950 observations. The number of observations is 61 less than 
17,011 because of data error in institutional holdings. The estimation uses the 
IBES and CDA/Spectrum information when it is available, and uses the full 
sample to estimate the coefficients unrelated to analyst following and institutional 
holdings.  
4. Variable definitions: the additional variables are defined below. See Table 3 for 
the definitions of other variables. 
(i) “Size t” is the within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a 
firm’s market value (Compustat Data199*Data25) at the beginning of Fiscal 
Year t .  
(ii) “BM t” is the within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a 
firm’s book-to-market ratio (Compustat Data60 / (Data199*Data25)) at the 
beginning of Fiscal Year t.  
(iii) “EarnStd t” is the within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of 
a firm’s standard deviation of earnings per share (Compustat Data58, adjusted 
for stock splits and stock dividends) for Fiscal Year t+1 to t+3, deflated by the 
stock price at the beginning of Fiscal Year t. 
(iv) “Analysts t” is the within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of 
a firm’s average number of analyst forecasts included in the monthly 
consensus, compiled by IBES during the fiscal year. If a firm-year is not 
covered by IBES, the number of analyst following is set to 0. 
(v) “Institution t” is the within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) 
of a firm’s average proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the 
end of each quarter of Fiscal Year t, obtained from the CDA/Spectrum 
database. If a firm-year is not covered by CDA/Spectrum, this variable is 
treated as missing in Panel B and the last column of Panel A, and is set to 0 in 
Panel C.  
(vi) “Dumcover t” is 1 if a firm-year is covered by IBES and 0 otherwise. 
(vii) “Dumhold t” is 1 if a firm-year is covered by the CDA/Spectrum institutional 
holdings database and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests 
Profit vs. Loss Firms 
 
 
Rt =   b0  +  b1 X t-1 + b2 X t + b3 X t3 + b4 R t3  + b5 IS t + b6 IS t * X t-1             Adjusted R2
      -0.000    -0.260    3.608    0.116     -0.079    -0.053        -0.415                       0.123 
      (-0.02)    (-5.12)  (26.86)   (3.11)    (-8.58)   (-2.78)        (-3.42) 
 
                     + b7 IS t *X t + b8 IS t * X t3 + b9 IS t * R t3   
                              0.082              0.172              -0.010 
                              (0.50)             (2.84)              (-0.63) 
 
                               + b10 Loss t + b11 Loss t * X t  +  b12 Loss t * X t3  + ε t                 
              -0.004              -3.259                     -0.334                                  
              (-0.25)             (-25.67)                  (-10.28)                         
 
 
Notes: See Table 3 for the definitions for other variables. 
1. “Loss t” is 1 if a firm reports negative earnings for Fiscal Year t and 0 otherwise. 
2. The number of observations is 17,019.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Tests 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
Primary Model 
Rt =  b0  +  b1 X t-1 + b2 X t + b3 X t3 + b4 R t3  + b5 IS t + b6 IS t * X t-1   
                           + b7 IS t *X t + b8 IS t * X t3 + b9 IS t * R t3  + ε t     
Extended Model 
Rt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2 CFOt + b3 CFOt3  + b4 ACCt-1 + b5 ACCt + b6 ACCt3 + b7 Rt3  
            + b8 ISt + b9 ISt * CFOt-1+ b10  ISt * CFOt + b11 ISt * CFOt3   
                        + b12 ISt * ACCt-1 + b13 IS t *ACCt + b14 IS t *ACCt3 + b15 IS t * Rt3 + ε t           
Primary Model Extended Model Time-Series 
Statistics    
X t IS t * X t IS t *X t3 CFO t IS t * CFOt ISt * CFOt3
Mean 0.887 0.565 0.097 1.062 0.388 0.162 
Median 0.770 0.576 0.106 1.013 0.273 0.126 
Fama-MacBeth 
t statistic 
11.76 4.65 1.70 10.26 2.62 3.19 
 
 
Notes:  
1. See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
2. The models are each run on 21 industry-year cross sections during 1980-2000. 
The Fama-MacBeth approach treats the coefficients from the annual regressions 
as i.i.d.  
3. For firm-years post-1988, operating cash flows are obtained from Compustat 
Data308. For firm-years pre-1988, operating cash flows are calculated using the 
balance-sheet approach (Collins and Hribar, 2002).  
4. Different from other tables, IS uses a firm’s current and prior seven years’ change 
in discretionary accruals and change in pre-managed income.    
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